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Long-Arm Statute Reaches International Corporation -
Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth
Maui Island Tours ordered tour buses from Haleakala Motors in Hawaii.
Haleakala transmitted this order to Vauxhall of England, which manufac-
tured the chassis and sent them to another British corporation, Duple
Motor Bodies, Ltd. Duple constructed coach bodies on the chassis and re-
turned the buses to Vauxhall, which shipped them to Hawaii. While in
operation by Maui Island Tours, one of the buses skidded off the highway
and overturned, injuring the plaintiff, who was a passenger. Plaintiff al-
leged that Duple Motor Bodies was negligent in certain aspects of the design
and manufacture of the coach and that this negligence contributed to his
injury. Duple moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The federal
district court in Hawaii held that Hawaii's "long-arm" statute' gave that
state jurisdiction over Duple, and Duple took an interlocutory appeal.
Held, affirmed: Although the facts which establish liability, when disputed,
are not sufficient to establish jurisdiction, the intended presence of the
product in the forum state is sufficient contact to meet the requirements of
due process. Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231
(9th Cir. 1969).
I. DUE PROCESS AND IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
Since the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of the United
States has recognized constitutional limitations to a state's jurisdiction over
non-residents under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The evolution of extra-territorial jurisdictional rules began with what has
been called the "power theory,"' under which a state had no jurisdiction
over an individual unless he was physically present within that state.' This
jurisdictional power was later expanded to non-residents who "consented"
to the state's jurisdiction by doing business, or conducting continuous and
systematic activities, within the state. These activities were defined as
"minimum contacts."
4
The Court further expanded the ability of a state to obtain personal
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants in McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co.,' a case involving a claim for life insurance proceeds. The
'HAWAII REv. STAT. § 634-71 (1968):
Acts submitting to jurisdiction. (a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident
of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter
enumerated, thereby submits his person, and, if an individual, his personal representa-
tive, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising
from the doing of any of the acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this State;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State;
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State
at the time of contracting.
'See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
'Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
"International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
5355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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decedent, a resident of California, had purchased a life insurance policy
from an Arizona corporation. The defendant, a Texas company, assumed
the obligations of the Arizona corporation, and the decedent accepted an
invitation to continue his policy with the Texas company. The jurisdic-
tional question, raised in an action by a beneficiary of the policy, involved
the validity of a California statute granting jurisdiction in such a situation.!
The Court, noting that modern transportation and communications have
greatly decreased the burden of defending a lawsuit in a foreign state, and
recognizing the special interest of the state in insurance contracts, held that
"[i]t is sufficient for the purposes of due process that the suit was based on
a contract which had substantial connection with that state."7
The following year the Court reconsidered the McGee concept of "sub-
stantial connection" in Hanson v. Denckla. There, a woman domiciled in
Pennsylvania executed a revocable deed of trust to a Delaware trust com-
pany. The woman subsequently moved to Florida, and before her death she
executed certain powers of appointment concerning the trust. The issue
presented was whether Florida had jurisdiction over the Delaware trust
company in order to invalidate the Delaware trust under Florida law.
Noting that due process is more than a protection against inconvenient
litigation, the Court stated that it is "essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposely avails itself of the privileges
of conducting activities with the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protection of its laws."' The Florida court was found to be without
jurisdiction, as the only contact between the decedent and the Delaware
corporation was correspondence to and from Florida. The Court carefully
distinguished on the facts its earlier holding in McGee. 5
II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Based upon the Supreme Court's interpretations of "due process" in
connection with the exercise of jurisdiction over non-residents, state legis-
latures have enacted a variety of long-arm statutes." The Fifth Circuit has
'CAL. INS. CODE §5 1610-20 (West 1955) subjects foreign insurance companies to suit in
California on insurance contracts with residents of that state.
7355 U.S. at 223.
8357 U.S. 235 (1958).
9Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
10 The cause of action in this case is not one that arises out of an act done or trans-
action consummated in the forum State. In that respect, it differs from McGee ...
[where] the Court upheld jurisdiction because the suit 'was based on a contract that
had substantial connection with that State.' In contrast, this action involves the va-
lidity of an agreement that was entered without any connection with the forum
State. . . . [T]he record discloses no instance in which the trustee performed any
acts in Florida that bear the same relationship to the agreement as the solicitation
in McGee. Consequently, this suit cannot be said to be one to enforce an obligation
that arose from a privilege the defendant exercised in Florida. . . .This case is also
different from McGee in that there the State had enacted special legislation .. .to
exercise ... its 'manifest interest' in providing effective redress for citizens who had
been injured by . . . an activity that the State treats as exceptional . ...
Id. at 251-52.
" After McGee, the states produced statutes attempting to establish broad jurisdiction over
foreign corporations without denying the defendant his rights established by the Court. Typical
of these is the Illinois statute, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I10, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968), which was copied
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thus explained the procedure for testing a state's exercise of such jurisdic-
tion: "The first inquiry is whether state law provides for the exercise of
jurisdiction under the circumstances of the case presented. Conditioned on
an affirmative answer to this is the question whether the exercise of jurisdic-
tion pursuant to state law violates the Federal Constitution."" The major
controversies concern whether the requirements of due process are satisfied.
Some courts have held that Hanson generally restricted the reach of
long-arm jurisdiction allowed in McGee. To emphasize this restriction,
definite tests have been established in some cases. One such test was initiated
in Tyee Construction Co. v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc.," which held that
the execution of a single contract was not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction.
The court emphasized that the defendant must "purposely" do the act,
that the cause of action must arise from the act, and that the exercise of
jurisdiction must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.14 In Hearn v. Dow-Bodische Chemical Co."5 a federal district court
in Texas applied a test very similar to that used in Tyee Construction Co.,
but with the additional requirement that the forum state have some special
interest in granting relief in order to maintain jurisdiction.
At least one court has seen Hanson as tightening the McGee requirements
where the non-resident defendant committed only a single act. In O'Brien
v. Comstock Foods, Inc." the court held that a non-resident corporation
was not subject to jurisdiction in Vermont for injury to the plaintiff
caused by broken glass in a can of beans. The court, noting that the de-
fendant only placed the article in the stream of commerce, stated that the
"vital factor is the intentional and affirmative action on the part of the
non-resident ...within this jurisdiction."" In addition, some courts have
by Hawaii. See note I supra. These statutes usually consider the commission of a tort to be sufficient
to invoke jurisdiction. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
The North Carolina long-arm statute seems to be the most far-reaching. It provides for juris-
diction whenever an injury arises out of the "production, manufacture, or distribution of goods
.. .with the reasonable expectation . . . to be used or consumed in this State." N.C. GEN. STAT.
5S-145(3) (1960).
The Illinois, Maryland, Wisconsin, and New York statutes likewise are concerned with con-
tacts, but they also emphasize the commission or locus of a tortious act. Illinois extends its juris-
diction to include "[T]he commission of a tortious act within the state." ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968). Maryland, Wisconsin, and New York draw a distinction between
action wholly committed within the state, which immediately establishes jurisdiction, and an action
or omission occurring outside the state but causing injury within the state. In the latter situation,
the statutes establish prerequisites, such as doing or soliciting business within the state, MD. ANN.
CooE art. 75, § 96 (1969); the use of defendant's products within the state "in the ordinary
course of trade," Wss. STAT. § 262.05(4) (b) (Supp. 1969); or expecting the act to "have conse-
quences in the state and derive substantial revenue from interstate commerce." N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
LAW S 302(a) (3)(ii) (McKinney 1963).
1"Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1966); see
Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1961). This pro-
cedure has been referred to as the "two-pronged" test.
362 Wash. 2d 98, 381 P.2d 245 (1963).
14For applications of this rule by other jurisdictions, see Republic-Transcon Indus., Inc. v.
Templeton, 253 Miss. 132, 175 So. 2d 185 (1965); Mladinich v. Kohn, 250 Miss. 138, 164 So. 2d
785 (1964); O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966); Sun-X Int'l Co. v. Witt, 413
S.W.2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
" 2 2 4 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1963). See also Trinity Steel Co. v. Modern Gas Sales & Serv.
Co., 392 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), error ref. ir.e.
" 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963).17 194 A.2d at 570. See also Dragon Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 361 F.2d 43 (9th
NOTES
followed the Hanson test, feeling that the reasoning in McGee is peculiar
to the insurance field and should not be given general application."8
However, other courts have held that Hanson did not restrict the outer
limits of long-arm jurisdiction established by McGee. The Supreme Court
of Arizona has taken the position that Hanson "was an unusual situation
in which the court achieved substantial justice, but it is of questionable
value as a precedent regarding the problem of personal jurisdiction over
non-resident defendants.""5 A strong opinion that Hanson was not meant
to limit the scope of personal jurisdiction over non-residents, as established
by McGee, was written in chambers by Justice Goldberg. He noted that at
least one writer has interpreted Hanson as a general requirement "that the
defendant must have taken voluntary action calculated to have an effect
in the forum state.""0 This "calculated to have an effect" language has been
cited by several courts."
The greatest examples of disregarding the allegedly restrictive language
of Hanson are the cases finding jurisdiction on the commission of a single
"tortious act" through a test which might be described as "foreseeability."
The leading case in this area is Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp." In Gray suit was brought by an Illinois resident for
injuries sustained when a water heater, manufactured in Ohio, exploded
due to a defective valve. Jurisdiction over the manufacturer of the valve,
a Pennsylvania corporation, was upheld. The court, noting that "the com-
mission of a single tort within this state [has been] held sufficient to sus-
tain jurisdiction under the present statute,"2 concluded: "As a general
proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in
another state, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage
caused by defects in those products."2 This concept of foreseeability has
even been extended to allow personal jurisdiction to be maintained over a
non-resident corporation which merely placed an object in interstate
commerce. Metal-Matic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court," a Nevada
case involving a drowning caused by a defective boat railing manufactured
Cir. 1966); Lone Star Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961); Pendzimas
v. Eastern Metal Prods., 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1961).
'a Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts, 270 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 1959).
9 Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732, 735 (1966).2 Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 Sup. Ct. 1, 3, appeal dismissed, 382 U.S. 110
(1965). Goldberg, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari, cites Currie, The Growth of the Long
Arm, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 515.
21E.g., Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969); Etzler v. Dillie & Mc-
Guire Mfg. Co., 249 F. Supp. I (W.D. Va. 1965).
2222 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
2 176 N.E.2d at 765.
24d. at 766. Gray was thus described in Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass, 100 Ariz. 251,
413 P.2d 732, 736 (1966): "Essentially, the court [in Gray] held that a non-resident defendant
is amenable to personal jurisdiction where his defective product causes injury within the forum
though he did not intentionally put his product there, unless he . . . proves that the presence
of his product in the forum was an unforeseeable event." Gray has been followed by Eyerly Air-
craft Co. v. Killion, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969); Sheridan v. Cadet Chem. Corp., 25 Conn.
Supp. 17, 195 A.2d 766 (Super Ct. 1963); Anderson v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 257 Iowa
911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965); Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267
Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963); Roy v. North Am. Newspaper Alliance, Inc., 106 N.H. 92,
205 A.2d 844 (1964).
2 82 Nev. 263, 415 P.2d 617 (1966).
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by a Wisconsin corporation, illustrates this result. The court cited Gray
and extended it to hold that "Nevada may acquire jurisdiction over a
foreign manufacturer of a product which it reasonably may expect to enter
interstate commerce, which does enter interstate commerce, and because
of an alleged defect, causes injury ... to the plaintiff."2
III. DUPLE MOTOR BODIES, LTD. v. HOLLINGSWORTH
In Duple the Ninth Circuit, applying the two-pronged test,"7 found that
the alleged acts were sufficient for jurisdiction under the Hawaii long-arm
statute. In so finding, the court relied on Gray for the proposition that
"the place of a wrong is where the last event takes place which is necessary
to render the actor liable,"28 and concluded that "negligent manufacture
outside the state, resulting in injury in Hawaii, constituted commission
of a tortious act within Hawaii . . .. ,2"
The court further determined that there were sufficient minimum con-
tacts to meet the requirements of due process, but it declined to hold that
the alleged tortious act in itself was sufficient. Noting that it was dealing
with products liability in foreign trade, the court stated:
Here the facts establishing jurisdiction under the Hawaii statute (commission
of a tortious act within Hawaii) also establish liability and, where disputed,
cannot suffice as contacts with the forum state. What is needed is some addi-
tional factor that would render it fair to require the manufacturer to submit
these disputed issues to a foreign forum."°
This "additional factor" was found in the "knowledge" that the product
was "destined for Hawaii." 1 This "knowledge," according to the court,
made it "clearly foreseeable" that the product, if defective, could cause
injury in Hawaii.2
Circuit Judge Ely, dissenting, claimed that Duple did not invoke either
the benefits or the protection of the law of Hawaii, as it conducted all its
activities in England. 2 He stated that the "purposely avails itself" test of
Hanson, along with the concept that "fundamental fairness" depends on
the facts of each case, led him to the conclusion that the majority's holding
was "an implausible denial of due process as well as an unnecessary intru-
sion into the field of international relations." 4
20415 P.2d at 619. See also Roche v. Floral Rental Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 555, 232 A.2d 162
(Super. Ct. 1967).
27 See note 12 supra, and accompanying text.
8417 F.2d at 233. See also South Ariz. York Refrigeration Co. v. Bush Mfg. Co., 331 F.2d I
(9th Cir. 1964); Waynich v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959); St. Clair
v. Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966); Avery v. Peterson, 178 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa.
1959); Anderson v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965); RE-
STATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 337 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS S 146 (Tent. Draft 1968).
'9417 F.2d at 234.
30Id. at 235.
31 Id.2 Id.
33Id. at 239.
S4Id. at 236.
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